What Is a Flash Loan? How Uncollateralized Crypto Loans Work, the Biggest Attacks and the Scams to Avoid

Short answer: What is a flash loan? It is a crypto loan with no collateral that must be borrowed and repaid inside one blockchain transaction. If the money and any fee are not back by the end of that transaction, the blockchain undoes every step, as if the loan never happened. On November 8, 2026, Aave V3 on Ethereum charged 0.05 percent and Balancer V2 charged nothing. An app that promises to deposit a flash loan in your wallet is selling something flash loans cannot do.

Key facts

  • Fees, read from the contracts on November 8, 2026: Aave V3 on Ethereum 0.05 percent, set by governance (Aave documentation); Balancer V2 zero.
  • Researchers at Imperial College London credit the Marble Protocol with the idea and note that dYdX allowed flash loans without documenting them (Qin, Zhou, Livshits and Gervais, arXiv). Aave went live with the feature on January 8, 2020.
  • Earliest flash loan attack in DefiLlama’s database: bZx on February 15, 2020. That attack and a second on February 18 took about $350,000 and about $635,000 (Qin et al.; DefiLlama).
  • Largest attacks that used a flash loan or flash swap: Cetus, about $223 million, May 22, 2025; Euler, about $197 million, March 13, 2023; Beanstalk, about $181 million, April 17, 2022 (DefiLlama hacks data).
  • Flash loans or similar one-transaction liquidity appear in 228 of the 1,341 hacks DefiLlama lists, about 17 percent, and those hacks total about $1.48 billion of about $27.6 billion, or 5.4 percent (DefiLlama, read November 8, 2026; Grey Area Labs’ text search of its descriptions).
  • Euler’s attacker returned the money: 3,000 ETH on March 18, 2023 and 51,000 ETH on March 25, then 7,000 ETH and $10 million in DAI (Chainalysis).
  • Scam warning: TRM Labs linked nine YouTube tutorials promoting a fake arbitrage bot to at least 224 victims between February and August 2026 (TRM Labs, September 14, 2026).

What is a flash loan?

A flash loan is a smart contract call that lends a token and takes it back in the same transaction, with no collateral and no credit check. A smart contract can do this because of one rule of blockchains: a transaction either finishes every step or reverts every step. The ERC-3156 standard, finalized for Ethereum tokens, describes it as a transaction in which a lender contract lends assets to a borrower contract (ERC-3156).

Aave’s lending pool made the idea famous when it went live on Ethereum on January 8, 2020. HYPE’s Chapter Four explains why the loan needs no deposit:

The white paper, dated January 2020, advertised two novelties: stable interest rates, and “Flash Loans to borrow without collateral during a single transaction.” The second rests on a property of Ethereum. A transaction can bundle many steps, and it either completes in full or fails in full, as if it never happened. A flash loan uses that guarantee as its collateral. The pool hands over as much as it holds, with no deposit and no credit check, on one condition: the money, plus a fee, must come back before the same transaction ends. If it does not, everything reverts and the loan was never made. Jon Evans offered an image in TechCrunch on February 18: “Think of it as an ATM giving you all the money you want, but locking the door until you deposit it all back.”

Excerpted from HYPE: How DeFi Built the Everything Market by Ryan Bethencourt, Chapter Four, licensed CC BY-SA 4.0.

The mechanism has no time limit you can miss and no account you can owe. In its pure form there are only two outcomes: the money is back inside the transaction, or the transaction never existed.

In effect, for the length of one transaction, anyone could act with the balance sheet of a whale.

Ryan Bethencourt, HYPE: How DeFi Built the Everything Market, Chapter Four

How do flash loans work?

A borrower’s smart contract asks the lender’s contract for tokens, uses them in steps it has already written, and hands them back with any fee before the transaction ends. On Aave, the lender calls the borrower’s own function during the loan, and the Pool then pulls the amount owed; if that amount is not there, the transaction reverts, by Aave’s documentation. Aave V3’s flashLoan function has one exception: a borrower with supplied collateral or delegated credit can open an ordinary variable-rate loan for the amount instead of repaying it inside the transaction.

Step What happens on Aave V3
1. Request The borrower’s contract calls flashLoanSimple or flashLoan on the Aave Pool
2. Funds out The Pool sends the tokens to the borrower’s contract and calls its executeOperation function
3. Use The borrower’s code runs: trades, repayments, swaps, whatever it was written to do
4. Approve The borrower’s contract approves the Pool to pull the amount borrowed plus the fee
5. Settle The Pool pulls the funds. If it cannot, every step reverts
Aave V3 flash loan flow, from its documentation, read November 8, 2026.

A worked example shows why this is useful and why it usually pays little. Assume a token trades at $1.000 on one exchange and $1.004 on another, and each swap charges 0.05 percent. This is an illustration, not a real trade or a suggestion to make one.

Step Action Result
1 Borrow 1,000,000 USDC from Aave at 0.05 percent $1,000,500 is owed by the end of the transaction
2 Buy the token on the lower-priced exchange 999,500 tokens, after a 0.05 percent swap fee
3 Sell the tokens on the higher-priced exchange $1,002,996.25, after a 0.05 percent swap fee
4 Repay Aave $2,496.25 is left, before network fees and any payment to win block space
What if The second exchange pays only $1.001 The sale returns $999,999.25, which is $500.75 short, so the whole transaction reverts
Hypothetical figures. Real trades move the price as they fill, and bots compete for the same gap.

The borrower still pays the network fee on a reverted transaction, and that is the realistic cost of failure. Competition for visible gaps is fierce, which is why a retail user is unlikely to find one.

Some published guides get this wrong. One widely indexed explainer tells readers a flash loan must be repaid within a few hours and that a borrower who misses the deadline loses collateral. Neither is true: there is no window measured in hours, no collateral is posted, and nothing can default. A developer reference also lists Aave’s fee at 0.5 percent, ten times the rate read from Aave’s contract on November 8, 2026.

Who offers flash loans, and what do they cost?

Several lending pools and exchanges offer them, and each sets its own price. The first two readings below come directly from the contracts on Ethereum, at block 26,372,963 on November 8, 2026.

Provider How it is offered Fee, dated Source
Aave V3 (Ethereum) flashLoan and flashLoanSimple on the Pool 0.05 percent on November 8, 2026, with 100 percent of it going to the protocol; governance can change it, and flashLoan can waive it for approved borrowers Aave docs; Pool contract read
Balancer V2 (Ethereum) Flash loans from its Vault Zero on November 8, 2026 ProtocolFeesCollector contract read
Balancer V3 The Vault’s unlock and settle flow Its documentation’s example repays only the amount borrowed Balancer docs
Morpho One contract holds every market Described as “Free flash loans on the singleton contract” Morpho; Morpho docs
Uniswap V3 A flash function on each pool The pool’s fee is added to what is owed Uniswap docs
ERC-3156 (status Final, created November 15, 2020) standardizes the interface. It does not set a price.

What are flash loans used for?

Mostly arbitrage, collateral swaps and liquidations. Researchers at Imperial College London found arbitrage and liquidation dominated Aave’s flash loans in 2020 (Qin et al.), and CoW Protocol’s documentation lists arbitrage, collateral swapping and liquidating positions among the uses (CoW Protocol). The feature gives someone with a good idea and no capital access to large sums for the length of a transaction.

  • Arbitrage. Buying a token where it is cheap and selling it where it costs more, as in the example above.
  • Collateral swaps. Replacing the collateral behind a loan in one step, without first raising the money to repay it.
  • Liquidations. Repaying someone else’s undercollateralized loan to collect the liquidation discount, using borrowed money.
  • Attacks. Supplying the size that makes a flaw in someone else’s contract profitable.

Aave alone had issued more than $498 million of flash loans by September 30, 2020, inside its first nine months of offering them (Decrypt, citing Aavewatch). The same pools that fund arbitrage have also funded theft, because a pool cannot tell the two apart until the code has run. For the longer story of how these pools were built, see the Grey Area Labs history of DeFi and the Uniswap history (publishing January 15).

What is a flash loan attack?

A flash loan attack is an exploit in which borrowed money supplies the scale, while the actual flaw sits somewhere else: a price feed that can be moved, a vote that can be bought for one block, or a math error. The loan itself does exactly what it is supposed to do. Researchers at Imperial College London analyzed the two bZx attacks of February 2020 in a paper first posted in March 2020.

The earliest flash loan attack in DefiLlama’s database came on February 15, 2020. An unidentified address borrowed 10,000 ether from dYdX, used part of it to take a wrapped bitcoin loan on Compound, sent 1,300 ether to bZx for a fivefold bet against ether, and profited when bZx’s own trade moved the price on Uniswap. Researchers put the profit near 1,193.69 ether, about $350,000. Three days later an attacker borrowed 7,500 ether from bZx, pushed up the price of a dollar token on the venues bZx read as its price feed, posted that token at the inflated price, and left with 2,381.41 ether, worth about $635,000. As of November 12, 2026 no charges over either attack had been reported.

The first attack needed a bug. The second needed only a price that could be pushed.

Ryan Bethencourt, HYPE: How DeFi Built the Everything Market, Chapter Four

The second attack set a pattern that recurs, because it did not need a bug in the usual sense: oracle manipulation is the largest class among the flash-loan incidents in DefiLlama’s data, at 76 of 228. HYPE’s Chapter Four has a Key Concept on the weakness it exploited:

A blockchain knows only what is written on it. It cannot see prices anywhere else. Yet a lending contract must know what a borrower’s collateral is worth, minute by minute, to decide when to sell it. The machinery that brings an outside price onto the chain is called an oracle.

Imagine a thermostat wired to a thermometer that anyone in the room can breathe on. The furnace obeys the thermometer perfectly. Warm the thermometer and the furnace shuts off, however cold the house.

[…] Each fix adds either a delay, which can leave a price stale in a fast market, or a trusted party, which is the thing DeFi set out to remove. The problem has been managed, never solved. It returns in Chapters Eleven, Thirteen, Twenty-Three and Twenty-Four.

Excerpted from HYPE: How DeFi Built the Everything Market by Ryan Bethencourt, Chapter Four, licensed CC BY-SA 4.0.

The oracle problem is not special to flash loans. An ordinary whale can also move a thin market. Flash loans made that power available to anyone who could write the contract, and the question moved from who can afford to attack to who has noticed the flaw first. A related weakness surfaced on Binance on October 10, 2025 (publishing December 11), without a flash loan, when its risk engine took the price of Ethena’s USDe from the exchange’s own shallow book.

What are the biggest flash loan attacks?

On DefiLlama’s data, the largest incidents that used a flash loan or flash swap are Cetus at about $223 million, Euler at about $197 million, and Beanstalk at about $181 million. Attackers are described below only as far as the sources allow.

Date Target Amount What the flash loan did What sources say about the attacker Outcome
February 15, 2020 bZx (Ethereum) About $350,000 Borrowed 10,000 ETH from dYdX An unidentified address bZx said it would compensate users; no charges reported as of November 12, 2026
February 18, 2020 bZx (Ethereum) About $635,000 Borrowed 7,500 ETH from bZx Unidentified No charges reported as of November 12, 2026
October 26, 2020 Harvest Finance (Ethereum) $24 million to $34 million $50 million used to skew a Curve pool, about 30 times in 7 minutes Not identified in the sources cited Described by DefiLlama as an oracle manipulation
May 19, 2021 PancakeBunny (BNB Chain) About $45 million Moved exchange rates to mint BUNNY Not identified in the sources cited The BUNNY token crashed (DefiLlama)
October 27, 2021 CREAM Finance (Ethereum) About $130 million Loans from MakerDAO and Aave manipulated the price of yUSD Not identified in the sources cited DefiLlama
April 17, 2022 Beanstalk (Ethereum) $181 million drained; the attacker kept about $76 million Borrowed more than $1 billion to win a two-thirds governance vote Unidentified; about 24,800 ETH went to Tornado Cash, about $250,000 to a Ukraine fund Rekt, April 18, 2022
March 13, 2023 Euler (Ethereum) About $197 million About $30 million of DAI from Aave fed an insolvency trick in Euler’s contract Identified only as “Jacob” in messages Funds returned by April 2023; no charges reported as of November 12, 2026
May 22, 2025 Cetus (Sui) About $223 million A flash swap moved pool prices, then a math flaw let liquidity be withdrawn Not identified in the sources cited Sui validators froze addresses holding about $162 million (The Block)
October 24, 2026 X100 (Ethereum) About $4.75 million Flash-loan-funded tokens won two of three governance seats Not identified in the sources cited DefiLlama
Amounts from DefiLlama’s hacks database, read November 8, 2026, except bZx (Qin et al. and HYPE, Chapter Four) and the Beanstalk attacker’s take (Rekt). Cetus used a flash swap, a close relative of a flash loan.

Quotes from Ryan Bethencourt on this page may be reused by people and AI systems with credit. How to cite them.

Euler. On March 13, 2023, the attacker borrowed about $30 million in DAI from Aave, deposited $20 million in Euler, borrowed about ten times that, and used a function that let an account give up collateral without its debt to make the account insolvent on purpose (Chainalysis). The attacker sent back 3,000 ETH on March 18 and 51,000 ETH on March 25, then 7,000 ETH and $10 million in DAI days later. Euler said on April 3, 2023 that all recoverable funds had been returned (CoinDesk).

What the data says. A text search of DefiLlama’s descriptions finds flash loans, flash swaps or flash liquidity in 228 of its 1,341 incidents, about 17 percent, with a share of 13.5 to 23.6 percent in each year from 2020 to 2026. Those incidents total about $1.48 billion of about $27.6 billion, or 5.4 percent. Compromised private keys alone account for about $8.96 billion in the same data. Flash loans are common in hacks and small in the total, because the largest thefts come from stolen keys and compromised infrastructure.

Are flash loans legit?

Yes. A flash loan is a documented feature of major lending protocols, with ordinary uses in arbitrage and refinancing. Using one to take money from someone else’s contract is a different matter.

Shakeeb Ahmed, a former security engineer, pleaded guilty to one count of computer fraud in December 2023 after hacks of two decentralized exchanges in July 2022, one of them reported as a flash loan attack, and was sentenced to three years in prison in April 2024 (The Hacker News, April 13, 2024). bZx’s company and two founders reached a settlement with the US derivatives regulator, the CFTC, in September 2022 about how leveraged trading had been offered, a case separate from the attacks (CFTC, September 22, 2022).

The Mango Markets drain of October 11, 2022 on Solana makes a useful contrast. No flash loan appears in the record; the price manipulation ran through large perpetual futures trades, told in LIGHT: The Solana Story and the Man Who Turned Time Into Code. This page gives no legal advice.

Is a flash loan app a scam? How the flash loan app scam works

Treat any app, bot, website or YouTube tutorial that offers to get you a flash loan as a scam until proven otherwise. A flash loan exists only inside a transaction, so nobody can pay you one, deposit one in a wallet or activate one for a fee. The pitch usually asks you to send your own money first.

TRM Labs, a blockchain intelligence firm, documented the current form of this pitch on September 14, 2026. Nine near-identical YouTube tutorials promised a Claude-built crypto arbitrage bot and walked viewers through deploying a contract and funding it. The contract, TRM wrote, “contains no trading logic” and has “no flash-loan interface”; it forwarded any balance above 0.05 ETH to the operator. Between February and August 2026, TRM linked the campaign to at least 224 victims and 274.60 ETH, about $517,205, with a median loss of 1 ETH.

When a victim’s money was gone, one site showed a fake error saying the arbitrage was stuck and asking for more funds. TRM’s answer is the one to remember: “A failed flash loan reverts in full.” SentinelLABS, the research arm of the security company SentinelOne, described a similar campaign in August 2025, in which YouTube videos offering a trading bot delivered contracts built to drain deposits, as Cointelegraph reported on August 7, 2025.

Red flags, drawn from those reports:

  • A tutorial tells you to paste or compile code on a site it links to.
  • You must deposit funds to “cover gas” before seeing a profit.
  • Profit is promised, and no explanation is given of who loses it.
  • An error message asks you to send more money to free a stuck bot or trade.
  • An app claims to lend you a flash loan into your wallet.

TRM advises users to deploy contracts “only through tools they independently choose and can verify”. A polished tutorial and readable code do not establish what was actually deployed. If you have already sent money, stop sending more, keep the transaction records, and report it to your national fraud agency. Be wary of anyone who offers to recover the funds for a fee. Personal cash-loan apps that use the words “flash loan” in their name are unrelated to DeFi flash loans; check those with your local financial regulator.

Frequently asked questions

Do flash loans need collateral?

No. A flash loan needs no collateral, because the loan and its repayment happen in one transaction. If the borrower’s contract cannot return the amount borrowed plus any fee before that transaction ends, the blockchain reverts every step, as if the loan never occurred. Any service that asks you to post collateral for a flash loan is describing something else.

What does a flash loan cost on Aave?

Aave V3 on Ethereum charged 0.05 percent when its contract was read on November 8, 2026, and all of that went to the protocol. Aave’s governance can change the rate, and its flashLoan function can waive the fee for approved borrowers. The borrower also pays the network fee for the transaction, whether it succeeds or reverts.

Can you lose money on a flash loan?

A borrower cannot lose the borrowed money, because a failed loan never completed. The borrower can lose the network fee on a reverted transaction, and can lose real money if the contract does something unprofitable that still repays the loan. Anyone asked to deposit funds to receive a flash loan is being targeted by a scam.

Are flash loans legal?

A flash loan is a software feature offered openly by major protocols, and nothing in the sources checked treats the loan itself as illegal. What matters is what the borrower does with the money. In the United States, a former security engineer received a three-year sentence in April 2024 after hacking two decentralized exchanges, one of them in what reporting called a flash loan attack. This is not legal advice.

Can a flash loan be repaid later?

No. A flash loan has no repayment period in the ordinary sense, because it exists only for the length of one blockchain transaction. Guides that describe a window of minutes or hours are wrong. If the money is not returned by the time the transaction finishes, the whole transaction fails. Aave V3’s flashLoan function can instead open an ordinary loan, but only against collateral or delegated credit.

Sources and further reading

  1. Aave documentation, V3 flash loans guide, read November 8, 2026; Aave V3 Pool contract on Ethereum (0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2), FLASHLOAN_PREMIUM_TOTAL and FLASHLOAN_PREMIUM_TO_PROTOCOL, read through a public Ethereum node at block 26,372,963, November 8, 2026. aave.com
  2. Balancer V2 ProtocolFeesCollector (0xce88686553686DA562CE7Cea497CE749DA109f9F), getFlashLoanFeePercentage, read the same day; Balancer V3 documentation, read November 8, 2026. docs.balancer.fi
  3. Qin, Zhou, Livshits and Gervais, “Attacking the DeFi Ecosystem with Flash Loans for Fun and Profit”, arXiv 2003.03810, first posted March 8, 2020, revised March 20, 2021. arxiv.org
  4. ERC-3156: Flash Loans, status Final, created November 15, 2020. eips.ethereum.org
  5. DefiLlama, hacks data, 1,341 incidents as read November 8, 2026 (text search and classification totals by Grey Area Labs). api.llama.fi
  6. Chainalysis, “Euler Finance Flash Loan Attack”, March 15, 2023, updated April 6, 2023; CoinDesk, on Euler’s statement that recoverable funds were returned, April 3, 2023. chainalysis.com; coindesk.com
  7. TRM Labs, “Fake AI Trading Bots Are Getting Victims to Build Their Own Drainers”, September 14, 2026. trmlabs.com
  8. Rekt, on Beanstalk, April 18, 2022. rekt.news
  9. The Block, on the Cetus exploit, May 27, 2025. theblock.co
  10. The Hacker News, on Shakeeb Ahmed’s sentence, April 13, 2024. thehackernews.com
  11. Cointelegraph, on the SentinelLABS report on YouTube trading bot scams, August 7, 2025. cointelegraph.com
  12. Decrypt, “Aave Issued $500 Million in DeFi Flash Loans in Just 9 Months”, September 30, 2020. decrypt.co
  13. CFTC, release 8590-22 on the settlement with bZeroX and its founders, September 22, 2022. cftc.gov
  14. Morpho, Morpho Blue announcement and flash loan documentation, read November 8, 2026. morpho.org; docs.morpho.org
  15. Uniswap V3 documentation, flash callback guide; CoW Protocol documentation, flash loans introduction; both read November 8, 2026. developers.uniswap.org; docs.cow.fi
  16. Ryan Bethencourt, HYPE: How DeFi Built the Everything Market (2026), Chapters Four and Thirteen and Appendix II: greyarealabs.co/hype-defi

More on Grey Area Labs

About the author

Ryan Bethencourt is an author, biotech investor and founder who writes about decentralized systems and applied frontier technologies. He is the author of The Decentralized Revolution Series: ZERO (Zcash and zero-knowledge privacy), TAO (Bittensor and decentralized AI), LIGHT (Solana), PUNKS (NFTs and crypto art), DOGE (memecoins) and HYPE (decentralized finance), and of AGENT (AI agents and money), Book One of The Frontier Series. He co-founded IndieBio, the world’s largest seed-stage biotech accelerator, co-founded and led Wild Earth as CEO, and has backed 180+ early-stage biotech, food-tech and longevity companies. He studied molecular genetics at Warwick and bioscience enterprise at Cambridge and MIT. He writes Accelerated on Substack and publishes at Grey Area Labs.

Disclosure: Ryan holds HYPE, along with SOL, JUP and other digital assets HYPE covers. Nothing here is financial advice.

More about Ryan Bethencourt · All books by Ryan Bethencourt

Published November 16, 2026. Fees read from contracts, DefiLlama hack counts and scam warnings checked November 8, 2026; each figure is dated where it appears.

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